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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
HONG NGUYEN, : Case No. 970207-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996), granting 
jurisdiction over "appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony." The sentencing court reduced the degree of the 
offense from a first degree to a second degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to 
sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery. 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse a jury 
verdict for insufficient evidence "when the evidence, [viewed in 
a light most favorable to the verdict] . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
in support of Aggravated Robbery is preserved on the record 
("R.») at 80, 103-04. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions determinative of the issue on 
appeal are: 
Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1997) : 
1) A person commits robbery if: . . . (b) the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. (2) An act shall be considered "in 
the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission. (3) 
Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Aggravated Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) : 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use 
a dangerous weapon . . . (2) Aggravated robbery is a 
first degree felony. (3) For purposes of this part, an 
act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt or 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Burglary of a Vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (1995) : 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
intent to commit a . . . theft is guilty of burglary of a 
vehicle. (2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Hong Nguyen ("Nguyen") was charged by 
information with one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), and an 
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arrest warrant was issued. R. 5-7. Appellant entered a plea of 
not guilty. R. 18. 
At the close of Nguyen's trial, defense counsel moved to 
dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery or, alternatively, to 
reduce the charge to burglary of a vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-204 (1995), due to insufficiency of the evidence. R. 80, 
lll[103-04]. The trial court denied Appellant's motion, holding 
that a jury could find Nguyen guilty of aggravated robbery based 
on the evidence presented by the State. R. Ill [103-04] . The 
jury found Nguyen guilty as charged. R. 77, 111 [103-04] . 
Upon Nguyen's motion and pursuant to his statutory 
authority, § 76-3-402, the sentencing judge reduced the offense 
from a first to a second degree felony and sentenced Nguyen to 
prison for one to fifteen years. R. 86-87, 89. Nguyen timely 
appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of February 15, 1996, Robert 
Miles Carper ("Carper") drove to the Westerner Club to pick up a 
friend. R. Ill [45-46]. The club's parking lot was full so 
Carper parked a block away in the lighted lot of another 
restaurant. R. Ill [46] . Carper's car was the only car in that 
lot. R. Ill [47, 56] . 
Carper walked to the club, went inside, found his friend, 
and told his friend to wait while he retrieved the car. R. 
Ill [46-47] . Carper walked back to his car alone. As he 
approached the car from the back, he noticed a strange man, whom 
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he later identified as Appellant Nguyen, sitting in the driver 
seat. R. Ill [48] . Carper saw that the driver's side window was 
smashed. Id. Carper also observed that Nguyen was attempting to 
pry the stereo out with a screwdriver. R. Ill [69] . 
Carper confronted Nguyen, asking "what do you think 
you're doing?" R. Ill [49]. Carper testified that Nguyen 
brandished the screwdriver and told him to back off or Nguyen 
would kill him. R. Ill [48] . Carper stated that he backed away 
from the car about four feet while Nguyen exited the car through 
the broken window. R. Ill [49, 51] . Nguyen began to run off when 
Carper yelled, "stop!" Id. According to Carper, Nguyen again 
brandished the screwdriver. Id. Carper kicked Nguyen in the 
chest. Id. Nguyen took off running toward the Westerner club, 
screwdriver in hand, and Carper followed in chase. R. Ill [49-
51]. Carper caught up with Nguyen in front of the club and 
pushed him face-forward to the ground. R. Ill [50-51] . The 
screwdriver flew out of Nguyen's hand into the gutter. R. 
Ill [51] . Carper tackled Nguyen. R. Ill[54] . 
Roger Dean Tulley ("Tulley"), a private security guard 
employed by the Westerner, was standing in front of the club as 
he observed Carper chase Nguyen and push him to the ground. R. 
Ill [76] . Tulley immediately intervened and pulled the men apart 
because Carper was beating Nguyen. R. Ill [76, 83] . 
Carper explained to Tulley that he caught Nguyen stealing 
his car stereo and that Nguyen had threatened him with a 
screwdriver. R. Ill [77] . Tulley called for backup and 
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handcuffed Nguyen. R. Ill [71, 83]. Tulley called the police, 
then walked with Carper to Carper's car to observe the damage. 
R. Ill [52, 77] . 
At the car, Carper and Tulley saw a large rock in the 
front seat. R. 111[53, 78]. Carper also testified that he found 
a strange set of keys sitting on the passenger front seat. R. 
Ill [53] . Tulley did not offer such testimony. Carper and Tulley 
returned to the club to await the police. R. Ill [60] . Tulley 
retrieved the screwdriver laying in the gutter and set it aside 
in a planter box next to the door of the club. R. Ill [80] . 
When a police officer arrived, Carper explained what 
happened. R. Ill [60] . The officer retrieved the screwdriver, 
noted it on his incident report and entered it as evidence. 
Nguyen was arrested and booked for public intoxication. R. 
Ill [72] . 
The officer told Carper to bring his car to the Westerner 
parking lot. R. Ill [60] . Carper testified that he showed the 
police officer the large rock and the keys found in the front 
seat. R. 111[60, 64]. Carper also testified that the officer 
took the keys and that Nguyen admitted ownership. R. Ill [60, 65-
66]. The officer's report, however, did not indicate that a set 
of keys was admitted as evidence. R. Ill [73]. Carper likewise 
did not mention the set of keys in his witness statement or 
during his testimony at Nguyen's preliminary hearing. R. Ill [62-
63]. The screwdriver was not presented as evidence at trial and 
the police officer who responded to the incident did not testify. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Nguyen's motion to 
dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery or, alternatively, to 
reduce the charge to vehicle burglary where the marshalled 
evidence did not adequately support the aggravated robbery 
conviction. Specifically, the State failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence of Nguyen's intent to commit aggravated robbery. Under 
the circumstances of this case, Nguyen's actions do not 
constitute the sort of violent armed encounter contemplated by 
the aggravated robbery statute. Nguyen thus respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction end enter judgment 
for the lesser included offense of burglary of a vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Marshalled Evidence Does Not Establish Nguyen's 
Intent to Commit Aggravated Robbery. 
The trial court erred in denying Nguyen's Motion to 
dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery or, alternatively, to 
reduce the charge to vehicle burglary where the evidence failed 
to establish Nguyen's intent to commit aggravated robbery. The 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom do not establish 
that Nguyen's actions amounted to the sort of violent armed 
encounter contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute. 
In order to sustain the aggravated robbery conviction, 
the State must have presented evidence that would have allowed 
the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Nguyen 
unlawfully and intentionally used force or fear against Carper in 
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the course of committing a theft1 and used or threatened to use 
a dangerous weapon.2 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301(b) (Supp. 
1997) (robbery), 76-6-302 (1995) (aggravated robbery); see also 
Addendum A (Information) and Addendum B (jury instructions). 
The jury found Nguyen guilty based on the following 
marshalled evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict3: 
The complainant Carper testified that Nguyen twice waved 
a screwdriver at him, yelling "back off or I will kill you," 
after Carper discovered Nguyen in the act of stealing the stereo 
out of his 1987 Camaro with the same screwdriver. R. Ill [48-51]. 
The additional testimony of witness Tulley established that a 
screwdriver was found in the area where he saw Carper chase, 
push, then tackle Nguyen. R. Ill [76, 80]. Tulley, who saw 
Carper's car after the incident, corroborated Carper's allegation 
that Nguyen broke into the car by testifying that he observed the 
1
 "[I]n the course of committing a theft" refers to the 
"attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or [] the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
301 (2) . 
2
 For purposes of aggravated robbery, a "dangerous weapon 
means any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-501 (2) (d) (Supp. 1997). In deciding whether an object 
constitutes a "dangerous weapon, " the fact finder may consider the 
"(i) the character of the instrument . . .; (ii) the character of 
the wound produced, if any; (iii) the manner in which the 
instrument . . . was used; and (iv) the other lawful purposes for 
which the instrument . . . may be used." Id. 
3
 See State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah App. 
1992)(appellant has burden of marshaling evidence in support of 
verdict then showing insufficiency). 
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smashed driver's side window and a large rock lying in the front 
seat of the car. R. Ill [52-53]. 
This evidence, however, does not establish the sort of 
violent armed encounter contemplated by the aggravated robbery 
statute and thereby fails to establish the specific intent 
required to support the aggravated robbery conviction.4 See 
State v. Bovland, 495 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah 1972) (robbery 
conviction sustained only upon requisite showing of specific 
intent); see also State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78-79 (Utah 
1981)(same). The evidence adduced by the State, if believed, at 
most evinces an intent to commit vehicle burglary.5 
In crimes requiring a showing of specific intent, such as 
aggravated robbery, the "prosecution must prove the intent with 
which the act was done." Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 
1978). "[I]ntent [] must be proved before the conduct may be 
said to be culpable. . . [An] act in itself does not raise the 
presumption that it was done with the specific intent required to 
prove the offense." State v. Castoncruay, 663 P. 2d 1323, 1326 
4
 "Specific intent" is a term of art and is not used in the 
Utah Criminal Code. See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah 
App. 1992), aff 'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court noted that the term "has utility in describing a 
culpable mental state, or mind set, that describes a required 
purpose, knowledge, attitude, or motive, in addition to the mere 
volitional act. A subjective purpose, attitude, motive, or 
knowledge of acts or consequences makes the critical moral 
difference." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 260 (Utah 1988). 
5
 Vehicle burglary is the "unlawful [] ent[ry of] any vehicle 
with intent to commit a . . . theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 
(1995) . Theft occurs when " [a] person . . . obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). 
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(Utah 1983) . 
An actor's culpable mental state may be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. Id. "All the circumstances, when taken 
together, must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that 
of guilt to warrant conviction." Id. (citation omitted). With 
regard to aggravated robbery, the requisite intent "may be 
inferred from the acts and conduct of the accused, the nature of 
the weapon used . . . and the manner in which it was used, taken 
together with all the other circumstances in the case." State v. 
Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1982)(citation omitted), 
partially overruled on other grounds by State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 
843, 848 n.5 (Utah 1992); see also, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
501(d)(defining "dangerous weapon" and factors for 
consideration). 
The evidence adduced by the State at trial, however, 
failed to establish that Nguyen's actions rose to the level of 
aggravated robbery and consequently failed to establish Nguyen's 
intent to commit that crime. First, Nguyen's actions and the 
manner of the screwdriver's use are not properly characterized as 
an armed encounter where an individual threatens a victim in 
order to unlawfully seize his or her property. According to 
Carper, Nguyen was using the screwdriver to remove the stereo 
from the car. R. Ill [69] . Nguyen did not employ the screwdriver 
against Carper in order to gain initial access to the Camaro and 
did not produce the screwdriver for the sole purpose of 
threatening Carper. Nguyen did not touch Carper's person nor 
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inflict any wound with the screwdriver. In fact, Carper's 
testimony indicates that Nguyen opted to break into the car while 
Carper was away and the car was unattended in a deserted lot. 
Compare State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988) 
(screwdriver constituted "dangerous weapon" for purposes of 
aggravated sexual assault conviction where defendant held 
screwdriver against victim's neck in order to initiate assault). 
Nguyen waved the screwdriver only after Carper 
aggressively confronted him. Carper admitted that he was very 
angry about his car. R. Ill [52, 67]. He testified that he 
accosted Nguyen, asking "what do you think you are doing," and 
approached within eighteen inches of him. R.Ill[49, 69]. 
Carper, at 6'2" and two hundred pounds, was standing over Nguyen, 
who was sitting in the driver's seat with the car door closed, 
when Nguyen initially waved the screwdriver. R. Ill [68] . 
Nguyen's second wave of the screwdriver occurred after he 
attempted to run away but Carper forcefully yelled "stop!" R. 
Ill [50, 71] . Under the given circumstances, it is evident that 
Carper did not view the screwdriver as enough of a threat to 
deter him from verbally and physically challenging Nguyen. 
Moreover, the fact that Nguyen waved the screwdriver at all 
evinces his desire to escape the admittedly angry Carper, who was 
himself behaving in an aggressive and confrontational manner.6 
6
 Carper's rage further manifested itself when he kicked 
Nguyen in the chest, chased Nguyen then pushed Nguyen to the ground 
and tackled him with such vigor that the security guard had to 
separate the two men in order to prevent Carper from beating 
Nguyen. R. 111[51, 76, 83]. 
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The fact that Nguyen carried a screwdriver to the crime 
scene rather than some other weapon of force more expeditious to 
an armed encounter further indicates that he intended, at most, 
to break into Carper's car. Screwdrivers are the traditional 
tool of malefactors seeking to pry something loose or open. See, 
e.g. , State v. Ncruven, 878 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Utah App. 1994) 
(screwdriver used to pry open coin box)(not appellant in this 
case); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1980)(same). 
Those who contemplate an armed personal encounter, on the other 
hand, tend to bring weapons of greater force, such as guns or 
knives. If Nguyen intended to commit aggravated robbery, he 
could have easily obtained a knife or possibly a gun. Compare 
State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 962 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding 
aggravated burglary conviction where defendant did not use but 
carried loaded pistol in get-away car within easy reach during 
flight from burglary scene). 
Nguyen, however, brought with him only a screwdriver; the 
evidence does not show that any other weapon was found on his 
person. Moreover, he chose a crime scene that was deserted and 
an early hour when an encounter would not be likely, as opposed 
to going to a house at night when people would be sleeping or 
attempting the theft at another high-traffic time or place. 
These circumstances indicate that Nguyen in no measure 
contemplated an armed encounter. 
In addition, the fact that the State did not produce at 
trial the screwdriver, the alleged weapon, and likewise failed to 
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present the testimony of the officer who responded to the 
incident further undercuts the sufficiency of the evidence for 
the aggravated robbery conviction. Without benefit of visually 
observing the screwdriver, the jury was unable to assess the 
feasibility of the screwdriver's use as a weapon; a thin, light 
screwdriver is arguably less menacing than a large, heavy one. 
Likewise, the jury did not have the benefit of the responding 
officer's testimony and experienced observations of the crime 
scene. To the extent that the officer viewed the burgled car, 
interviewed Carper, arrested Nguyen, and submitted the 
screwdriver into evidence, his testimony would have been 
pertinent and helpful. Without such information, the jury did 
not have sufficient information from which Nguyen's intent to 
commit aggravated robbery could be inferred.7 
Finally, Nguyen's aggravated robbery conviction does not 
7
 The paucity of evidence indicating Nguyen's intent is 
further undercut by Carper's own uncorroborated and substantially 
discredited testimony regarding a set of keys that he allegedly 
found at the crime scene and that he claimed belonged to Nguyen. 
R. 111[53, 60]. If Carpers's claims are true, the keys would 
provide a significant link between Nguyen and the incident and 
would be duly admitted as evidence. 
Despite Carper's claims, however, the keys were not 
reported in the police report by the responding officer and were 
not entered into evidence. R. Ill [73]. Tulley did not testify 
that he saw the keys although he clearly remembered seeing the rock 
which, according to Carper, laid next to the keys in the front 
seat. R. Ill [78] . Carper himself failed to mention the keys in 
his witness statement that he filled out at the crime scene and 
likewise omitted any mention of the keys during his testimony at 
Nguyen's preliminary hearing. R. Ill [62-63]. Where Carper's 
testimony is the only evidence of the alleged threat with a 
screwdriver for purposes of the aggravated robbery conviction, the 
incredible claim regarding the keys raises doubts about his 
remaining testimony in support of the aggravated robbery 
conviction. 
12 
serve the statutory distinction between "aggravated" offenses and 
less egregious conduct, nor the corollary deterrent purpose in 
"discouraging violent behavior in the commission of an otherwise 
nonviolent crime." Seel, 827 P.2d at 962; see also State v. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987)("statutory distinction" 
between aggravated robbery and robbery is the "'tangible'" versus 
imagined threat with weapon)(quotation omitted). "Aggravated" 
offenses censure distinctively frightening and violent armed 
encounters, which often involve bodily injury, and reflect a 
level of culpability discrete from other crimes. Consequently, 
"aggravated" offenses bear significantly higher penalties than 
unaggravated offenses.8 
As discussed above, the facts and circumstances of this 
case are not properly characterized as a violent assault upon a 
victim by use of a weapon in order to unlawfully steal the 
victim's property. Case law demonstrates the level of 
egregiousness required to properly convict an individual for 
aggravated robbery. For example, this Court affirmed an 
8
 Compare Assault, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 
1997)(attempting, threatening, causing, or creating substantial 
risk of injury)(class A misdemeanor if injury results; class B 
misdemeanor if no injury) with Aggravated Assault, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (Supp. 1997) (assault causing serious bodily injury; 
assault accompanied by deadly force or dangerous weapon)(second 
degree felony if serious injury results; third degree felony if 
dangerous weapon used); Burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(unlawful entry and remaining with intent to commit felony, theft 
or assault) (1995) (second degree felony if committed in dwelling; 
third degree felony if not in dwelling) with Aggravated Burglary, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (burglary where substantial injury 
results or where dangerous weapon is threatened or used)(first 
degree felony). 
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aggravated robbery conviction in State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 
972-73 (Utah App. 1993), where evidence established that the 
defendant threatened the clerk by holding a pair a scissors to 
her stomach while demanding money. See also, State v. Humphrey, 
793 P.2d 918, 924-25 (Utah App. 1990) (upholding aggravated 
robbery conviction where defendant held shop owner and security 
guard at gunpoint in order to steal jewelry). Likewise, the 
Supreme Court affirmed an aggravated robbery conviction where the 
defendant struck the victim with a club and stabbed her with a 
knife while demanding to know where she kept her valuables. See 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 592, 594 (Utah 1988); see also 
State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1986) (affirming 
aggravated robbery conviction where defendant beat victims with 
club and shoved one victim's hand into fire while demanding 
money). 
The instant case, by contrast, does not rise to the level 
of egregious and violent behavior demonstrated in the 
aforementioned cases. Nguyen initially used the screwdriver to 
take the stereo from the car. R. Ill[48]. He did not rely upon 
it to seize possession of the car from Carper and, in fact, 
approached the car while it was unattended in an empty lot, 
suggesting that he sought to avoid a personal encounter. Id. 
Indeed, Nguyen only waved the screwdriver upon Carper's own 
aggression and never actually touched Carper's person. R. 
Ill [49-50]. Moreover, the screwdriver is not an inherently 
dangerous weapon of force, the very presence of which justifies a 
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conviction of aggravated robbery. Cf., Seel, 827 P.2d at 962 
(affirming aggravated burglary conviction based on fact that 
defendant carried loaded pistol in get-away car, even though 
defendant never used it). Given these facts, this case does not 
arise to the egregious level of conduct contemplated by the 
aggravated robbery statute and proscribed by Utah case law. 
Accordingly, Nguyen's conviction for aggravated robbery is 
unwarranted and "pervert[s]" the meaning and deterrent effect of 
the statute. Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965. 
II. NGUYEN'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT 
ENTERED FOR THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE 
Where the evidence does not sufficiently support the 
conviction of aggravated robbery, Nguyen's conviction should be 
reversed and judgment entered for the lesser included offense of 
burglary of a vehicle. An appellate court has the authority to 
enter judgment for a lesser included offense, without necessity 
of a new trial and where the appellant so requests, if the court 
"determine [s] that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
402(5) (1995); see also State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 
1982); State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court submitted an instruction for the lesser 
included offense of burglary of a vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
2 05. R. 69; see also Addendum B. To the extent that the jury 
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convicted Nguyen of the greater offense of aggravated robbery, 
the "jury necessarily found every fact required for conviction of 
[the] included offense." Bolsincrer, 699 P. 2d at 1221. 
Burglary of a vehicle requires a showing that the 
defendant "unlawfully enter[ed] any vehicle with intent to commit 
a felony or theft," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204(1). While the 
evidence does not establish that Nguyen committed aggravated 
robbery, as discussed supra Point I, the evidence arguably shows 
that Nguyen "unlawfully enter[ed] [Carper's] vehicle with intent 
to commit . . . theft," to wit, Nguyen unlawfully entered the 
unattended vehicle and used the screwdriver to pry the stereo 
loose with the intent to steal it. Accordingly, this Court may 
reverse Nguyen's conviction for aggravated robbery and enter 
judgment for burglary of a vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Nguyen respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his conviction of aggravated robbery due to 
insufficiency of the evidence and enter judgment for the lesser 
included offense of burglary of a vehicle. 
SUBMITTED this V-fcC day of February, 1998. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 0 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
H W l /y 
ROBIN JSL-jJUNGBERG . ^ ^ 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK, 0367 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HONG NGUYEN DOB 10/21/57, 
AKANONE 
OTN 07949118 
Defendant. 
Screened by: R. B lay lock 
Assigned to: TBA 
BAIL: $10,000.00 
Warrant/Release: FTF 
Case No. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
97KXH-W 
The undersigned Kevin Nudd - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 3370 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 15, 1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, HONG 
NGUYEN, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Robert Carper from the person or immediate presence of Robert Carper, 
and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous 
weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Robert Carper. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
J. Terrill, Robert Carper, Roger Tulley, Kevin Nudd, Gayle Magera 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
Aggravated Robbery, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about February 15, 1997, the 
defendant either; 
a) Unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person or 
immediate presence, against his will by means of force or fear; 
Or 
b) . Unlawfully and intentionally used force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a 
theft. 
And 
2. The defendant either: 
a ) . Used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon; or 
b ) . Caused serious bodily injury upon another. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements, 
then you should consider the lesser-included offense of Burglary of 
A Vehicle. 
(c 
INSTRUCTION NO. / (J 
Burglary of a Vehicle may be a lesser-included offense to the 
crime of Aggravated Robbery. Thus, if your deliberations determine 
that the State has failed to prove Aggravated Robbery, you may 
consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser-included 
offense of Burglary of a Vehicle. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Burglary 
of a Vehicle, a lesser-included offense to Aggravated Robbery, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about February 
15, 1997; 
2. the defendant, Hong Nguyen; 
3. Unlawfully entered a vehicle; 
4. With the intent to commit a theft. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict 
the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of these elements, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
^ 
